PETITIONER:
\nJUTE AND GUNNY BROKERS LTD.AND ANOTHER<\/p>\n
Vs.<\/p>\n
RESPONDENT:
\nTHE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.(and connected appeals)<\/p>\n
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
\n17\/02\/1961<\/p>\n
BENCH:
\nWANCHOO, K.N.
\nBENCH:
\nWANCHOO, K.N.
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS<\/p>\n
CITATION:
\n1961 AIR 1214 1961 SCR (3) 820
\nCITATOR INFO :
\nD 1973 SC2061 (12)
\nF 1978 SC 389 (9,19,21,45)
\nE 1980 SC1163 (6)
\nACT:
\nRequisition and Acquisition of Property-Orders by Government
\nof India-Notice on managing agents Validity-Holders of
\nPacca delivery order, if owners of goods-Estoppel-Defence of
\nIndia Act, 1939 (35 of 1939)-Defence of India Rules, 1939,
\nrr. 75A, 119 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908),
\n0. XXIX, r. 2 Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 Of 1913), ss.
\n2(11),148-Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (3 Of 1930), S. 18.<\/p>\n
HEADNOTE:
\nThe Government of India entered into an agreement with the
\nPresident of Argentine Institute for Promotion of Trade to
\nsupply Hessian in return for licences for. shipment to India
\nof food-stuff purchased there and with a view to implement
\nthat agreement issued orders under r. 75A(i) of the Defence
\nof India Rules, 1939, on the managing agents of certain jute
\nmills on September 30, 1946, requisitioning hessian and
\ndirecting them and any other person in possession of the
\nsaid goods to deliver them to the Director of Supplies,
\nCalcutta. Although in the heading of the notices after the
\nnames of the managing agents it was not stated that they
\nwere being addressed as managing agents of such and such
\nmills, the schedules attached to them made it clear that
\nthey were addressed ‘as managing agents of such and such
\nmills. On the same day notices of acquisition under r.
\n75A(2) were served on the said managing agents and they were
\nfurther informed that under r. 75A(3) the goods would vest
\nin the Government at the beginning of the same day free from
\nany mortgage, pledge, lien and other similar encumbrance.
\nThe notices of acquisition were also accompanied by
\nschedules similar to those accompanying the requisition
\norders. The
\n821
\nGovernment of India tried to take possession of the hessian
\nbut was resisted by the mills and the holders of pucca
\ndelivery orders and brought the suit, out of which the
\npresent appeals arose, for enforcing the said orders of
\nrequisition and acquisition. The Defence of India Act,
\n1939, and the Rules made thereunder, had in the meantime
\ncome to an end and the question before the courts below was
\nwhether the orders of requisition and acquisition as served
\nwere effective in law. The trial judge held that as there
\nwere no valid orders of requisition as the mills had not
\nbeen properly served and since the goods were subject to
\npucca delivery orders, the mills as well as the Government
\nwere estopped from challenging the ownership of the holders
\nof the said delivery orders. The appeal court held that the
\norders of requisition were valid and binding, that the
\nmills, and not the holders of the delivery orders, were the
\nowners of the goods but that the notices of acquisition had
\nnot been served as required by r. 75A(2) Of the Rules and,
\ntherefore, there was no valid acquisition under r. 75A(3) Of
\nthe Rules.
\nHeld, that the requisition of the goods could be effected
\neither by taking possession of them or by requiring them to
\nbe placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority.
\nSince in the present case, the mills and not the holders of
\nthe delivery orders were admittedly in possession of the
\ngoods on the date of the requisition, the proper persons to
\nbe served with the orders were the mills.
\nSince the Rules did not expressly provide as to the manner
\nin which orders of requisition in writing under r. 75A had
\nto be served, r. 119(i) must apply and as the orders in the
\npresent case concerned an individual corporation, they had
\nto be served in the, manner prescribed by 0. XXIX, r. 2 of
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure.
\nThe word “officer” as defined by S. 2(ii) Of the Indian
\nCompanies Act, 1913, includes a managing agent and such
\ndefinition can be utilised for the purpose of the Code and
\nregard being ha to the nature of his duties there can be no
\ndoubt that a managing agent would be within the expression ”
\nother principal officer” in O. XXIX, r. 2(1) of the Code.
\nThere was no basis for the contention that service under r.2
\nmust be on some human being or that there could be no
\neffective service on a corporation by serving another
\ncorporation which might be its principal officer.
\nThe service of the orders of requisition on the managing
\nagents obviously meant for the mills in the instant case,
\nwas, therefore, good service under 0. XXIX, r. 3 Of the
\nCode.
\nSince r. 75A(2) itself did not provide for any mode of
\nservice of notice under it, either the one or the other of
\nthe modes specified in s. I48 of the Indian Companies Act,
\n1913, or 0. XXIX, r. 2 Of the Code would be a reasonable
\nmode of effecting service thereunder. In the instant case
\nthe notices of
\n822
\nacquisition having been served under 0. XXIX, r. 2(a), as
\nthe orders of requisition had also been, such service was
\ngood service and the acquisition was effective in law.
\nIt was not correct to say that the property in the goods
\nrepresented by the pucca delivery orders had passed to their
\nholders. The contract involved in such delivery orders is a
\ncontract of sale of unascertained goods and in view of s. 18
\nof the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, title cannot pass to
\nthe buyer till the goods are ascertained by appropriation.
\nAnglo-India jute Mills Co. v. Omademull (1910) I.L.R. 38
\nCal. 127, explained.
\nIt was not correct to say that the Government of India in
\nacquiring the requisitioned goods was claiming title through
\nthe mills and would be, like them, estopped qua the holders
\nof pucca delivery orders. The power to acquire the property
\nflowed from the Defence of India Act and the Rules made
\nthereunder and covered not merely the rights of the owners
\nbut the entire goods. Rule 75A(3) of the said Rules made it
\nquite clear the acquisition thereunder was of a title
\nparamount and of the whole of the property freed from all
\nkinds of encumbrances.
\nNo question of serving any notice on the holders of pucca
\ndelivery orders, therefore, arose in the present case as the
\nproperty in the goods had not in law passed to them.<\/p>\n
JUDGMENT:
\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 314-316 &
\n778 of 1957.
\nAppeals from the Judgment and Decree dated September 8,
\n1954, of the Calcutta High Court in appeal from Original
\nDecree No. 159 of 1951.
\nS. Chowdhury, B. Das and P. K. Ray Chaudhury, for the
\nappellants in Civil Appeal No. 314 of 1957.
\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy
\nIyer and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.
\nS. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.
\nS. M. Bose, B. Sen and B. N. Ghosh, for respondents Nos.
\n3-18, 20-40, 42 and 44-47.
\nB. N. Ghosh, for respondent No.48.
\nN. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No.
\n51.
\nS. M. Bose, S. Chowdhury, B. Sen and B. N. Ghosh, for the
\nappellants in Civil Appeal No. 315 of 1957.
\nM. C. Setlvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy
\nIyer and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.
\nS. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.
\n823
\nP. K. Ray Chaudhury, for respondent No. 6.
\nB. Das and P. K. Ray Chaudhury, for respondents Nos. 8-28.
\nP. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 30.
\nS. Chowdhury and P. K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellant in
\nCivil Appeal No. 316 of 1957.
\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy
\nIyer and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.
\nS. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.
\nB. Das and B. N. Ghosh, for respondents Nos. 3-18, 20-40,
\n42, 44, 47 and 49-69.
\nN. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No.
\n71.
\nM. C. Stealvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy
\nIyer and D. Gupta, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 778
\nof 1957.
\nS. M. Bose, S. Chowdhary, B. Sen and B. N. Ghosh, for
\nrespondents Nos. 2-17, 19-39, 41 and 43-46.
\nSukumar Ghose, for respondent No. 40.
\nS. Chowdhury and P. K. Ray Chaudhury, for respondent No.
\n47.
\nS. Chowdhury, B. Das and P. K. Ray Chaudhury, for
\nrespondents Nos. 49-69.
\nN. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No.
\n71.
\n1961. February 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
\nby
\nWANCHOO, J.-These four appeals on certificates granted by
\nthe High Court at Calcutta arise out of one judgment and
\nwill be dealt with together. The brief facts necessary for
\npresent purposes are these: In September 1946 there was food
\nshortage in the country. In order to relieve this shortage,
\nthe Government of India entered into an agreement with the
\nPresident of Argentine Institute for Promotion of Trade by
\nwhich it undertook to freeze, requisition and take over and
\nsell to the Argentine Institute and ship to Argentine 30,000
\ntons of hessian and, in return the Institute guaranteed to
\nobtain licences for shipment
\n824
\nfrom Argentine of maize and wheat offals already purchased
\nby the Government of India in Argentine. This agreement was
\narrived at on September 27, 1946. In anticipation of this
\nagreement, the Government of India on September 20, 1946,
\naddressed letters to the managing agents of various jute
\nmills in Bengal demanding from them information as to stocks
\nof hessian of certain description held by the mills under
\ntheir managing agencies and prohibiting them from selling,
\ntransferring, removing, consuming or otherwise disposing of
\nany article enumerated in Sch. B to the communication.
\nThis demand was made under Sub-rule (5) of r. 75-A of the
\nDefence of India Rules (hereinafter called the Rules).
\nAfter the information had been gathered, the Government of
\nIndia issued an order on September 30, 1946, to the same
\nmanaging agents requisitioning the hessian specified in the
\nSchedule to the order and directing them and every other
\nperson in possession of the said property to deliver it to
\nthe Director of Supplies, Calcutta, and in the meantime not
\nto dispose of the property in any manner without the
\npermission of the Central Government. The Schedule to the
\norder in each case indicated the mill from which the
\nrequisition was made, the quantity, the description of the
\nhessian and the name of the registered stock-holders. These
\nrequisition orders were served upon the managing agents of
\nthe mills under sub-r. (1) of r. 75-A of the Rules on that
\nvery day. Thereafter on the same day, that is, September
\n30, 1946, the Government of India issued a notice under sub-
\nr. (2) of r. 75-A to the managing agents communicating that
\nit had been decided to acquire the property under that sub-
\nrule. The managing agents were further informed that by
\nvirtue of sub-r. (3) of r. 75-A the said property would vest
\nin the Central Government at the beginning of the day on
\nwhich the notice was, served upon them free from any
\nmortgage, pledge, lien or other similar encumbrance. The
\nnotices of acquisition were accompanied by schedules similar
\nto the schedules accompanying the requisition orders. This
\nnotice of acquisition was also served on the same day on all
\nthe
\n825
\nmanaging agents. Further on the same day the Deputy
\nDirector of Supplies, Government of India, wrote to the
\nSecretary, Indian Jute Mills Association that shipping
\ninstructions would be issued in due course by the Director
\nof Supplies, Calcutta, with respect to hessian requisitioned
\nand acquired under the orders and notices already referred
\nto. The Government then tried to take possession of the
\nhessian requisitioned and acquired but the mills and the
\nholders of delivery orders resisted the Government’s attempt
\non the ground that the orders of requisition and acquisition
\nwere invalid. The Government of India then filed the suit,
\nout of which the present appeals have arisen, on December
\n11, 1946, for enforcing the orders of requisition and
\nacquisition and also applied for a receiver to be appointed.
\nThis application was resisted and it became apparent that it
\nwould take some time before it could be disposed of. As
\nships which were to carry the hessian to Argentine were
\nready and shipment could not be delayed, the Government on
\nJanuary 7, 1947, promulgated an Ordinance, being Ordinance
\nNo. I of 1947, whereby notwithstanding the pendency of the
\nsuit the title and possession of the goods requisitioned and
\nacquired were made to vest in the Government. The
\nGovernment then took possession of the hessian and shipped
\nthe same to Argentine. The suit however did not become
\ninfructuous or unnecessary after this because s. 3 of the
\nOrdinance provided that the suit should be proceeded with in
\nregard to one question involved in it and decision thereon
\nobtained. Under s. 3 it was provided that if in the suit it
\nwas finally decided that the said goods were not validly
\nrequisitioned or acquired by the Central Government on the
\n30th day of September, 1946, each of the several previous
\nowners of -the said goods would be entitled to receive as
\ncompensation from the Central Government the market price
\nprevailing on the date of the institution of the aforesaid
\nsuit; but if no such decision was made in the suit, the said
\ngoods would be deemed to have been validly requisitioned and
\nacquired by the Central Government on the 30th September,
\n1946, and the
\n826
\namount of compensation to be paid by the Central Government
\nto the several previous owners of the said goods would be
\ndetermined in accordance with the provisions of law in force
\non September 30, 1946, relating, to the requisition and
\nacquisition of movable property under the rules made under
\nthe Defence of India Act, 1939. It may be mentioned that
\nthe Defence of India Act, 1939, and the Rules made
\nthereunder came to an end on September 30,1946. The main
\nquestion therefore which remained to be decided in the suit
\nwas whether the orders of requisition and acquisition were
\nvalid and binding on the respective defendants; and the suit
\nwas confined to obtaining a declaration to that effect. If
\na declaration was granted to the Government of India as
\nprayed, the compensation would be determined as on September
\n30, 1946, in accordance with the provisions of law in force
\non that day relating to the requisition and acquisition of
\nmovable property under the rules made under the Defence of
\nIndia Act, 1939. On the other hand, if no such declaration
\nwas granted, compensation would have to be arrived at in
\naccordance with the market price of hessian prevailing on
\nthe date on which the suit was filed, i.e., December 11,
\n1946.
\nThe main questions which arose for determination in the
\ntrial court were four, namely-(1) Were the alleged orders of
\nrequisition dated September 30, 1946, -mentioned in the
\nplaint properly and\/or validly and\/or duly served? (2) Did
\nsuch alleged orders effect any valid requisition of the
\ngoods mentioned in the Schedules to such orders? (3), Were
\nthe orders and notices of acquisition mentioned in the
\nplaint properly made or given and\/or duly served ? (4) Is
\nthere any custom of trade, practice or usage that upon
\ndelivery orders being made over to the buyers against
\npayment the property in the goods represented by such
\ndelivery orders passed to such buyers ?
\nSarkar, J., who tried the suit on the original side of the
\nHigh Court held that the orders of requisition were properly
\nand validly made. He further held that there was no service
\nof the orders on the mills which were in possession of the
\nhessian and which
\n827
\nhad to be served in order to effect a valid requisition. He
\ntherefore held that as there was no proper or due service of
\nthe orders there was no -valid or binding requisition.
\nFurther on the question of acquisition he held that as the
\ngoods requisitioned and acquired were subject to pucca
\ndelivery orders and in view of the usage that pucca delivery
\norders were only issued against payment, were passed from
\nhand to hand by endorsement and were sold and dealt with in
\nthe market as absolutely representing the goods to which
\nthey relate and as the mills were estopped from challenging
\nthat the property in the goods had passed (see Anglo-India
\nJute Mills Co. v. Omademall (1)), the Government which was
\nclaiming ownership through the mills was also subject to
\nestoppel and as the holders of the delivery-orders being the
\nowners of the property were not served on September 30,1946,
\nunder r. 75-A (2) of the Rules, the property in the goods
\ntherefore did not pass on September 30, 1946. On this view
\nthe suit was dismissed.
\nThe Union of India then went in appeal. The appeal court
\nreversed the view of Sarkar J. on the question of
\nrequisition. It held that the requisition orders did affect
\nand intended to affect individual mills and service on the
\nmanaging agents of the -mills was good service on the mills
\nand therefore the orders of requisition were valid. On the
\nquestion of acquisition the appeal court posed the question
\nwhether the notices of acquisition were served on the owners
\nas required by r. 75-A (2). It did not agree with the view
\nof Sarkar J. that the Government was claiming through the
\nmills and were therefore estopped from challenging the title
\nof the holders of delivery orders. It also held that
\nproperty in the goods could not pass by estoppel in the face
\nof the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, III of 1930.
\nAccordingly it held that it was not necessary to serve the
\nholders of the delivery orders with notices of acquisition ;
\nbut it further held that the mills which were the owners of
\nthe goods requisitioned were not served with the notices of
\n(1) (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 127,
\n828
\nacquisition, as in its opinion strict compliance with, the
\nprovisions of the rules in 0. XXIX of the-Code of Civil
\nProcedure were necessary in order that transfer of ownership
\ncontemplated under r. 75-A of the Rules, may be effected.
\nFurther as there was failure to comply strictly with the
\nprovisions of 0. XXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure and as
\nin the view of the appeal court r. 119 (I-B) of the Rules
\ndid not apply,,, to the case, there was no service of
\nnotices of acquisition on the owners as required by r. 75-A
\n(2) of the Rules therefore it held that the acquisition was
\nnot valid. In the result the appeal was partly allowed as
\nto the effect of the requisition orders but the view of
\nSarkar J. was upheld as to the effect of notices of
\nacquisition.
\nThis has been followed by four appeals on certificates
\ngranted by the High Court. Appeals Nos. 314 to 316 are by
\nthe defendants in the suit challenging the view of the
\nappeal court that the orders of requisition were valid and
\nbinding. The appellants in these appeals will hereinafter
\nbe referred to as the defendants. Appeal No. 778 is by the
\nUnion of India challenging the view of the appeal court that
\nthe, notices acquisition were not properly served and,
\ntherefore there was no acquisition of property: on September
\n30, 1946, as provided by r. 75-A (3).
\nWe shall first deal with the three appeals by the defendants
\nrelating to the requisition-orders. It is necessary to set
\nout rr. 75.A and 119 of the Rules in this connection, for
\nthe validity of the requisition orders depends upon whether
\nthe, two rules have been complied-‘, with. The two rules
\nare as follows:-
\n” 75A. (1) If in the opinion of the Central
\nGovernment or the Provincial Government it is
\nnecessary or expedient so to do for securing
\nthe defence British India, public safety, the
\nmaintenance of public order or the efficient
\nprosecution of the war, or for maintaining
\nsupplies and services essential to the life of
\nthe community, that Government may by order in
\nwriting requisition any property, movable or
\nimmovable, and may make-such further orders as
\n829
\nappear to that Government to be necessary or
\nexpedient in connection with the
\nrequisitioning :
\nProvided that no property used for the purpose
\nof religious worship and no such property as
\nis referred to in rule 66 or in rule 72 shall
\nbe requisitioned under this rule.
\n(2) Where the Central Government or the
\nProvincial Government has requisitioned any
\nproperty under sub-rule (1), that Government
\nmay use or deal with the property in such
\nmanner as may appear to it to be expedient,
\nand may acquire it by serving on the owner
\nthereof, or where the owner is not readily
\ntraceable or the ownership is in dispute, by
\npublishing in the Official Gazette, a notice
\nstating that the Central or Provincial
\nGovernment, as the case may be, has decided to
\nacquire it in pursuance of this rule.
\n(3) Where a notice of acquisition is served
\non the owner of the property or published i
\nn
\nthe official gazette under sub-rule (2), then
\nat the beginning of the day on which the
\nnotice is so served or published, the property
\nshall vest in Government free from any
\nmortgage, pledge, lien or other similar encum-
\nbrance and the period of the requisition
\nthereof shall end.
\n(4)……………………………………”
\n“119. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
\nin these Rules, every authority, officer or
\nperson who makes any order in writing in
\npursuance of any of these Rules shall, in the
\ncase of an order of a general nature or
\naffecting a class of persons, publish notice
\nof such order in such manner as may, in the
\nopinion of such authority, officer or person,
\nbe best adapted for informing persons whom the
\norder concerns, in the case of an order
\naffecting an individual corporation or firm
\nserve or cause the order to be served in the
\nmanner provided for the service of a summons
\nin rule 2 of Order XXIX or rule 3 of Order XXX
\nas the case may be in the First Schedule to
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908),
\nand in the case of an
\n830
\norder affecting an individual person (not
\nbeing a corporation or firm) serve or cause
\nthe order to be served on that person–
\n(i) personally, by delivering or tendering
\nto him the order, or
\n(ii) by post, or
\n(iii)where the person cannot be found, by
\nleaving an authentic copy of the order with
\nsome adult male member of his family or by
\naffixing such copy to some conspicuous, part
\nof the premises in which he is known to have,
\nlast resided or carried on business or
\npersonally worked for gain.
\n(1-A). Where any of these Rules empowers an
\nauthority, officer or person to take action by
\nnotified order, the provisions of sub-rule (1)
\nshall not apply in relation to such order.
\n(1-B). If in the course of any judicial
\nproceeding, a question arises whether a person
\nwas duly informed of an order made in
\npursuance of these Rules, compliance with sub-
\nrule (1), or, in a case to which sub-rule (1-
\nA) applies, the notification of the order,’
\nshall be conclusive proof that he was so
\ninformed; but a failure, to comply with sub-
\nrule (1)-
\n(i) shall not preclude proof by other means
\nthat he had information of the order; and
\n(ii) shall not affect the validity of the
\norder.”
\nThe scheme of r. 75-A(1) which provides for requisitioning
\nis that the Government has to form an opinion whether it is
\nnecessary or expedient to make a requisition for securing
\nthe defence of British India, public safety, the maintenance
\nof public order or the efficient prosecution of the war or
\nfor maintaining supplies and services essential to the life
\nof the community. After such opinion has been formed, the
\nGovernment may by order in writing requisition any property,
\nmovable or immovable, and make such further orders as appear
\nto it to be necessary ;or expedient in that connection. It
\nhas been faintly urged on behalf of the defendants that the
\norders of requisition were invalid as they did not comply
\nwith
\n831
\nthe first condition indicated above, namely, the necessity
\nor expediency of passing the order. It is enough to say
\nthat there is nothing in this contention. The order of
\nSeptember 30, 1946, states in so many words that ” in the
\nopinion of the Central Government it is expedient for
\nmaintaining supplies and services essential to the life of
\nthe community ” to make a requisition. It has never been
\nthe case of the defend. ants that the orders of requisition
\nwere passed mala fide In these circumstances, in the absence
\nof mala fide, the opinion of the Government is final and the
\npurpose indicated by it in the orders for making
\nrequisitions is one of the purposes for which an order of
\nrequisition can be made under r. 75-A.
\nThe main contention of the defendants in their appeals is
\nthat r. 75-A contemplates that the order of requisition must
\nbe brought to the knowledge of the person whose interests
\nare being affected by it and that this was not done in this
\ncase, for neither the holders of delivery orders nor the
\nmills were apprised of the orders of requisition on
\nSeptember 30, Therefore, it is urged that the orders of
\nrequisition were not valid and binding. Now sub-rule (1) of
\nr. 75-A does not specifically provide for the manner in
\nwhich an order of requisition is to be served, nor does it
\nprovide specifically on whom such an order should be served.
\nSo far as the person on whom an order of requisition should
\nbe served is concerned, we agree with the appeal court that
\nservice of such an order is necessary on the. person who can
\nplace the goods in question at the disposal of the
\nrequisitioning authority and until that is done there cannot
\nbe any valid and effective requisition. This is also clear
\nfrom the definition of the word ” requisition ” in r. 2(11)
\nof the Rules, for ” requisition ” means in relation to any
\nproperty, to take possession of the property or to require
\nthe property to be placed at the disposal of the
\nrequisitioning authority. Therefore a requisition of
\nproperty can be effected either by taking possession of the
\nproperty or by requiring the property to be placed at the
\ndisposal of the requisitioning authority. In the present
\ncase we are concerned with
\n832
\nthe second mode of requisition. In such a case it is
\nnecessary that the party which is required to place the
\ngoods in question at the disposal of the requisitioning
\nauthority should be informed of the order of requisition, so
\nthat it may place the property at the disposal of the
\nrequisitioning authority as required by the order. Three
\nquestions therefore immediately &rise in this connection,
\nnamely, (i) who were the proper persons on whom orders of
\nrequisition should have been served, (ii) what is the manner
\nin which the orders should have been served, and (iii)
\nwhether proper persons have been served in the proper manner
\nin this case.
\nSo far as an order of requisition is concerned, we are of
\nopinion that there is no question of any service of the
\norder on the holders of delivery orders, for whatever may be
\ntheir position as to the ownership of the goods (a matter
\nwith which we shall deal later when considering the matter
\nof, acquisition), they were admittedly not in possession of
\nthe goods on September 30. Further the goods were
\nadmittedly in the possession of the mills and therefore the
\nproper persons to be served with the orders of requisition
\nin this case were the mills.
\nThe next question is as to the manner in which the mills
\nwhich were in possession of the goods had to be served. To
\nthat the answer is in our opinion to be found in r. 119 of
\nthe Rules. Rule 119 (1) provides that save as otherwise
\nexpressly provided in these rules every order in writing in
\npursuance of any of these rules shall be served in the
\nmanner provided therein. Now there is no express provision
\nas to the manner in which an order of requisition in writing
\nissued under r. 75-A has to be served ; therefore it has to
\nbe served as provided in r. 119 (1). Further, as orders in
\nthis case concerned an individual corporation they had to be
\nserved in the manner provided for’ service of summons in r.
\n2 of 0. XXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 2 of 0.
\nXXIX provides that where ‘the suit is against a corporation,
\nthe summons may be served on the secretary, or on any
\ndirector, or other principal officer of the corporation, or
\nby leaving
\n833.
\nit or sending it by post addressed to the corporation as
\nthe, registered office or if there is no registered office
\nthen at the place where the corporation carries on business.
\nWe have therefore to see whether the mills were served with
\nthe orders of requisition in the manner provided by r. 2 of
\n0. XXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further in case
\nthere is any irregularity in service it will have to be seen
\nwhether the matter comes under sub-r. (1-B) of r. 119.
\nLet us therefore first examine the question whether the
\nmills were served as provided in 0. XXIX, r. 2. Now the
\norders of requisition were sent to the managing agents of
\nthe various jute mills. It is true that in the heading of
\nthe order, though the name of the managing agency
\ncorporation was mentioned, it was not specifically stated
\nthere that the order was being addressed to it as the
\nmanaging agents for such and such mills. But when one reads
\nthe schedule attached to each order sent to the managing
\nagents, it becomes immediately clear that the order was
\nintended for the mills mentioned in the schedule and was
\nbeing served on the managing agents of the mills. As an
\ninstance, we may refer to one requisition order addressed to
\nMessrs. Thomas Duff and Co. Ltd. In the, schedule it was
\nclearly stated that the order was with respect to jute bales
\nheld by the jute mills under the managing agency of the
\naddressee and the names of the jute mills with respect to;
\nwhich the order was passed and was being communicated to the
\nmanaging agents were also mentioned, that is, Titaghur,
\nVictoria, Samnaggur (South) and Samnaggur (North) Jute,
\nMills. Any one. receiving this order should be therefore
\nable immediately to understand that the order was -served on
\nMessrs. Thomas Duff and Co. Ltd., as the managing agents of
\nthe four jute mills mentioned above. The defect therefore,
\nin the form of address was in our opinion of no consequence.
\nThe order read as a whole along with the schedule leaves no
\ndoubt that the order was meant for the jute mills mentioned
\nin the schedule and was addressed to Messrs. Thomas Duff
\nand Co. Ltd. as the managing agents of, those jute mills, It
\nis not in dispute, that
\n834
\norders of requisition with respect to other mills addressed
\nto other managing agents were in the same form and
\ncontained- similar schedules. There can therefore in our
\nopinion be no doubt that the orders of requisition were
\nmeant for the mills and were addressed to them through the
\nmanaging agents. It is not in dispute that those orders
\nwere served on the managing agents on September 30, 1946,
\nand the only question therefore that remains to be
\nconsidered is whether the service on the managing agents on
\nbehalf of the mills is proper service as provided in r. 119
\n(1) of the Rules read with r. 2 of 0. XXIX of the Code of
\nCivil Procedure.
\nIn the matter of service, we are concerned with cl. (a) of
\nO. XXIX, r. 2, which provides that summons may be served on
\nthe secretary, or on any director or other principal officer
\nof the corporation ; and what we have to see is whether
\nservice on the managing agents was service on “other
\nprincipal officer” of the corporation. Section 2 (II) of
\nthe Indian Companies Act, No. VII of 1913, which was in
\nforce at the relevant time, defines an ” officer ” to
\ninclude any director, managing agent, manager or secretary.
\nSo a managing agent of a corporation is an officer of the
\ncorporation. The question then is whether he is,& principal
\nofficer, and the answer to our mind is obvious, considering
\nthe nature of the duties of a managing agent of a
\ncorporation. It is not seriously disputed either that if a
\nmanaging agent is an officer of the corporation, he would,
\nconsidering the nature of his duties, be a principal
\nofficer. What is, however, contended is that the definition
\nof an officer given in the Companies Act is an artificial
\ndefinition and is only for the purposes of the Companies Act
\nand not for the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal court
\ndid not accept this contention and was of the opinion that,
\nthe definition of an officer given in the Companies Act can
\nalso be utilised for the purpose of the Code of Civil
\nProcedure and we think,that that view is correct.
\nTherefore, when the service in this case was effected on the
\nmanaging agents of the mills it was effected on one of the
\nprincipal officers of the corporation and
\n835
\nwould be a good service under O. XXIX, r. 2 But it is
\ncontended that the intention behind O. XXIX, r. 2 is that
\nthe service must be on a human being and that O. XXIX, r. 2
\ndoes not contemplate service on one corporation for the
\npurpose of securing service on another corporation. In this
\nconnection reliance is placed on rr. I and 3 of 0. XXIX
\nwhere it is urged that the same words occur and it is clear
\nthat these rules contemplate that the other principal
\nofficer mentioned therein must be a human being. This
\ncontention was urged before the appeal court and was
\nrejected by it-and in our opinion, rightly. It is true that
\nunder rr. I and 3, the principal officer envisaged must be
\na human being, but that conclusion follows from the setting
\nin which these words appear in these two rules. Rule I
\nrelates to the signature and verification of a pleading by
\nthe secretary, director or other principal officer of the
\ncorporation while r. 3 provides that a court may require the
\npersonal appearance of the secretary or of any director or
\nother principal officer of the corporation. It is obvious
\ntherefore from the setting in which the words “other
\nprincipal officer” appear in these two rules that he must be
\na human being, for signature and verification in one case
\nand personal appearance in another can only be by a human
\nbeing. But rr. I and 3 do not define who a principal
\nofficer is. Therefore, even though in these two rules a
\nprincipal officer must be a human being, it does not follow
\nthat in r. 2 also he must be a human being. Rule 2 relates
\nto service and cl. (b) thereof clearly shows that the
\nservice to be effected need not necessarily be on a human
\nbeing connected with the corporation, for under el. (b) the
\nservice will be effective if the summons is left or sent by
\npost addressed to the corporation at the registered office
\nor if there is no registered office then at the place where
\nthe corporation carries on business. Therefore, for service
\nto be effective it is not necessary that summons must be
\nserved on some human being connected with the corporation.
\nNor do we see anything in 0. XXIX which would militate
\nagainst our holding that the service on one corporation may
\nbe made by serving
\n836
\nanother corporation which may be the principal officer of
\nthe first corporation. Once it is clear in view of the
\ndefinition of an ” officer” ins. 2 (11) of the Companies Act
\nthat a managing agent is an officer and when it is obvious
\nconsidering the nature of the duties of a managing agent of
\nthe corporation that it must be held to be a principal
\nofficer, service on the managing agent of a corporation
\nwould be effective service for the purpose of 0. XXIX, r. 2.
\nWe therefore agree with the appeal court that the orders of
\nrequisition in this case having been undoubtedly served on
\nthe managing agents of the mills as such there has been
\nproper service of the said orders on the mills as required
\nby r. 119 of the Rules. Therefore as the service on the
\nmills through the managing agents was good service within
\nthe meaning of r. 119 read with 0. XXIX, r. 2, it is
\nunnecessary to consider the further question whether it is
\ngood service within the meaning of r. 119 (1-B). We are
\ntherefore in agreement with the appeal court that the orders
\nof requisition were properly and validly and duly served on
\nthe mills through the managing agents and therefore these
\norders effected a valid requisition of the goods mentioned
\nin the schedules attached thereto. In this view Appeals
\nNos. 314 to 316 fail and are hereby dismissed.
\nNow we turn to the appeal of the Union of India with respect
\nto acquisition. It is not disputed that on the same day
\n(namely, September 30, 1946) notice of the decision to
\nacquire the requisitioned goods was served on the same
\nmanaging agents. Here again in the heading of the notice
\nonly the name of the managing agent was mentioned without
\nspecifying in so many words that the communication was being
\naddressed to the managing agents corporation concerned as
\nmanaging agents of such and such mills. But it is not in
\ndispute that as in the case of orders of requisition so in
\nthe case of notices of acquisition there was a schedule
\nattached and that schedule mentioned that acquisition was of
\ngoods held by the jute mills under the managing agency of
\nthe corporation to which the notice was addressed and the
\nnames
\n837
\nof the mills whose managing agents the addressed corporation
\nwas, were also mentioned in the schedule. It is clear
\ntherefore that the notice of the decision to acquire was
\ngiven to the various managing agents of the various mills in
\ntheir capacity as managing agents of the mills specified in
\nthe schedule and the question is whether the notice was in
\naccordance with r. 75-A (2). Rule 75-A(2) provides that
\nafter the property has been requisitioned the Government may
\nacquire it by serving on the owner thereof a notice stating
\nthat the Government has decided to acquire it. Further sub-
\nr. (3) of r. 75-A lays down that where a notice of
\nacquisition has been served on the owner, then at the
\nbeginning of the day on which the notice is so served the
\nproperty shall vest in Government free from any mortgage,
\npledge, lien or other similar encumbrance and the period of
\nthe requisition thereof shall end. Sub-rule (2) therefore
\nrequires that there should be a service of the notice of
\nacquisition on the owner of the property requisitioned. Two
\nquestions therefore immediately arise in view of the
\nprovisions of r. 75-A (2), namely, (1) that there should be
\na service of the notice on the owner, and (2) that this
\nservice should be in accordance with r. 75-A (2). If both
\nthese conditions are satisfied, r. 75-A (3) comes into play
\nand the property vests in the Government as provided
\ntherein.
\nThe first question therefore that arises is whether the
\nnotice in this case was served on the owner of the
\nrequisitioned goods. The argument on behalf of the
\ndefendants is that the requisitioned goods did not belong to
\nthe mills and that the real owners were the holders of the
\npucca delivery orders, and as there was no service of notice
\non them, there could be no acquisition under r. 75-A (3).
\nReliance in this connection is placed on Anglo-India Jute
\nMills Co.’s case (1). In that case it was held that ” by
\nthe usage of the jute trade in Calcutta, pucca delivery
\norders are issued only on cash payment, are passed from hand
\nto hand by endorsement and are sold and dealt with in the
\nmarket as absolutely representing the goods to which
\n(1) (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal. I27.
\n838
\nthey relate.” Therefore, it is urged that the owners of the
\ngoods were the holders of the pucca delivery orders and not
\nthe mills even though the goods were in the possession of
\nthe mills at the time when notices Of acquisition were
\nissued. Now it is not in dispute so far as these pucca
\ndelivery orders with which we are concerned in these appeals
\nare concerned that though holders thereof pay for the goods
\nspecified therein, at no time till actual delivery is given
\nis there any appropriation of the goods either to the
\ncontract or the delivery orders. In spite however of the
\nabsence of such appropriation, the holders of pucca delivery
\norders are regarded by the trade as the owners of the goods
\nspecified therein and as held in The Anglo-India Jute, Mills
\nCo.’s case (1) these pucca delivery orders are passed from
\nhand to hand by endorsement and are sold and dealt with in
\nthe market as absolutely representing the goods to which
\nthey relate. The question therefore that arises is whether
\nthe property in the goods represented by the pucca delivery
\norders can be said to have passed to the holders thereof,
\nwhen they receive them.
\nThe contention on behalf of the Union of India is that
\nproperty in the goods cannot pass in law to the holders of
\nthe pucca delivery orders till the goods are actually
\nappropriated to the particular order; therefore, as in this
\ncase it is not in dispute that no goods were actually
\nappropriated towards the pucca delivery orders concerned,
\nthe property in the goods did not pass to the holders
\nthereof but was still in the mills. Reliance in this
\nconnection is placed on s. 18 of the Indian Sale of Goods
\nAct, go. III of 1930. That section lays down that ” where
\nthere is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, no
\nproperty in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and
\nuntil the goods are ascertained.” In the present case, as we
\nhave already said it is not in dispute that the goods
\ncovered by the pucca delivery orders are not ascertained at
\nthe time such orders are issued and, ascertainment takes
\nplace in the shape of appropriation when the goods are
\nactually delivered in compliance
\n(1) (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 177.
\n839
\ntherewith. Therefore, till appropriation takes place and
\ngoods are actually delivered, they are not ascertained. The
\ncontract therefore represented by the pucca delivery orders
\nis a contract for the sale of unascertained goods and no
\nproperty in the goods is transferred to the buyer in view of
\ns. 18 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act till the goods are
\nascertained by appropriation, which in this case takes place
\nat the time only of actual delivery. The appeal court in
\nour opinion was therefore right in holding that the property
\nin the goods included in the pucca delivery orders did not
\npass to the holders thereof in view of s. IS of the Sale of
\nGoods Act in spite of the decision in the case of the Anglo-
\nIndia Jute Mills Co. (1). What that case decided was that
\nin a suit between a holder of a pucca delivery order-be he
\nthe first holder or a subsequent holder who has purchased
\nthe pucca delivery order in the market- and the mills, there
\nwill be an estoppel and the mill will be estopped from
\ndenying that cash had been paid for the goods to, which the
\ndelivery order related and that they held the goods for the
\nholder of the pucca delivery order. That case therefore
\nmerely lays down the rule of estoppel as between the mill
\nand the holder of the pucca delivery order and in a suit
\nbetween them the mill will be estopped from denying the
\ntitle of the holder of pucca delivery orders; but that does
\nnot mean that in law the title passed to the holder of the
\npucca delivery order as soon as it was issued even though it
\nis not disputed that there was no ascertainment of goods at
\nthat time and that the ascertainment only takes place when
\nthe goods are appropriated to the pucca delivery orders at
\nthe time of actual delivery. The appeal court was in our
\nopinion right in holding that the effect of the decision in
\nthe case of Anglo-India Jute.Mills Co. (1) was not that the
\nproperty in the goods passed by estoppel and that that case
\nonly decided that as between the seller and the holder of
\nthe pucca delivery order, the seller will not be heard to
\nsay that there was no title in the holder of the delivery
\norder. That case was not dealing with the question of title
\n(1) (1910) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 127.
\n840
\nat all as was made clear by Jenkins C.J. but was merely
\nconcerned with estoppel. In the present case the question
\nwhether the Government of India will be estopped is a matter
\nwhich we shall consider later; but so far as the question of
\ntitle is concerned there can be no doubt in view of s. 18 of
\nthe Sale of Goods Act that title in these cases had not
\npassed to the holders of the pucca delivery orders on
\nSeptember 30, 1946, for the goods were not ascertained till
\nthen, whatever may be the position of the holders of the
\npucca delivery orders in a suit between them and the mills
\nto enforce them.
\nThe next question then is whether the Government of India is
\nalso estopped from challenging that the title passed to the
\nholders of the pucca delivery orders as soon as they got the
\ndelivery orders. Sarkar J. seems to have taken the view
\nthat as the Government of India was claiming under the mills
\nand had stepped into the place of the mills by acquisition
\nand was claiming ownership through the mills, it would also
\nbe estopped from denying the title of the holders of pucca
\ndelivery orders in the same way as the mills through whom it
\nwas claiming. The appeal court on the other hand held that
\nthe Government of India was not claiming through the mills
\nand therefore would not be estopped like the mills from
\ndisputing the title of the holders of the pucca delivery
\norders. We are of opinion that the view of the appeal court
\nis correct. The Government was not acquiring the property
\nthrough the owners but under the power given to it by the
\nstatute, namely, the Defence of India Act and the Rules made
\nthereunder. It did not acquire merely the rights of the
\nowners of the property but the whole property. This is
\nclear from r. 75-A (3) which lays down that “where a notice
\nof acquisition is served on the owner of the property then
\nat the beginning of the day on which the notice is so
\nserved, the property shall vest in Government free from any
\nmortgage, pledge, lien or other similar encumbrance.” This
\nshows clearly that what the Government is acquiring under
\nthe statute is a kind of paramount title and not any title
\nderived from any owner, for
\n841
\ntitle derived from the owner would not be (for example) free
\nfrom mortgage, etc. Therefore when Government takes action
\nto acquire the requisitioned property under sub-r. (2) of r.
\n75-A by serving a notice of its decision to do so, it is
\nacquiring the whole property under the statute and is not
\nmaking any claim to the property through the mills. Thus it
\nis not merely the rights of the owners that the Government
\nacquires; it acquires the whole property free from all kinds
\nof encumbrances. What is thus acquired under the Defence of
\nIndia Rules is no particular person’s right but the totality
\nof the rights in the property. It cannot therefore be said
\nthat. the Government of India when it takes action under r.
\n75-A (2) is claiming through anybody: it acquires the
\ntotality of the rights in the property by virtue of the
\npower vested in it by the statute, eliminating all
\nsubsisting private rights. There can in such a case be no
\nestoppel against the Government of India qua the holders of
\nthe pucca delivery orders, for the Government of India is
\nnot stepping into the shoes of the mills but is acquiring
\ntitle which is paramount in nature. Therefore even though
\nthere may be an estoppel against the mills in view of the
\ndecision of The Anglo-India Jute Mills Co. (1), there can be
\nno estoppel against the Government of India. Further as in
\nlaw the property had not passed to the holders of the pucca
\ndelivery orders in the circumstances of this case, it was
\nnot necessary to serve them with notices under r. 75-A (2),
\nfor in law the owners were the mills and it was sufficient
\nif notices were served on them. We may incidentally make it
\nclear that the decision in the case of Anglo-India Jute
\nMills Co. (1) would still be good law in an appropriate case
\nwhere the question of estoppel can rightly arise.
\n” In view of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion at
\nwhich we arrive is that on September 30, 1946, the mills
\nwere in law the owners of the property which had been
\nrequisitioned and with respect to which notices of
\nacquisition were given on the same day. Therefore the
\nnotice required under r. 75-A (2) had to be given only to
\nthe mills.
\n(1) (1910) 38 Cal. 127.
\n842
\nThe question then which arises is whether due notice was
\ngiven to the mills under r. 75-A (2). The appeal court held
\nthat strict compliance with the provisions of the rule by
\nwhich such transfer of ownership can be effected was
\nnecessary. It further held that as notices were not
\naddressed in so many words to the managing agents as
\nmanaging agents of the various mills, there was no due
\nservice as required by r. 75-A (2) and therefore there was
\nno acquisition following on the service of the notices in
\nthis case. The first question that arises in this
\nconnection is the manner in which notice has to be served
\nunder r. 75-A (2). Now all that r. 75-A (2) says’ is that
\nnotice of the decision to acquire the property has to be
\nserved on the owner thereof (except in certain circumstances
\nwith which we are not concerned). The contention of the
\nlearned Attorney-General on -behalf of the Union of India is
\nthat. a notice under r. 75-A (2) has also to be served in
\nthe manner provided in r. 119 and that therefore the
\nprovisions of r. 119 (1-B) would also apply to service of
\nsuch a notice. On the other hand it has been contended on
\nbehalf of the defendants that r. 119 refers to service of
\norders in writing and r. 75-A(2) does not speak of an order
\nin writing as is the case in r. 75-A(1). We do not think it
\nnecessary for purposes of this case to decide whether a
\nnotice stating that the Government has decided to acquire
\nthe requisitioned property is an order in writing as
\ncontemplated under r. 119. Assuming that it is not so, it
\nstill remains to be seen how a notice of the kind envisaged
\nin r. 75-A (2) has to be served on a corporation. The
\nappeal court was of the view that as r. 75-A (2) did not
\nprovide for the manner of service and as in its opinion r.
\n119 did not apply, the service of a notice under r. 75-A (2)
\nmust be in a reasonable manner. Proceeding on the
\nassumption that r. 119 does not apply, it seems to us that
\nthe view of the appeal court that a notice under r. 75-A (2)
\nmust be served in a reasonable manner is correct. What then
\nis this reasonable manner of service of notice under r. 75-
\nA(2)? In this connection reference may be made to two
\nprovisions in two other Acts. The first
\n843
\nis a provision in s. 148 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
\nwhich was then in force. That section provides that-
\n” a document ‘may be served on a company by
\nleaving it at, or sending it by post to, the
\nregistered office of the company. ”
\nThe other provision is 0. XXIX, r. 2 of the
\nCode of Civil Procedure, which we have already
\nconsidered. We may however read the opening
\nwords of this rule for this purpose. They are
\nas follows:-
\n” Subject to any statutory provision
\nregulating service of process, where the suit
\nis against a corporation the summons may be
\nserved… ”
\nIt will be seen that r. 2 of 0. XXIX of the Code of Civil
\nProcedure is subject to any statutory provision regulating
\nservice of process and where there is any specific statutory
\nprovision r. 2 would not be applicable. The only other
\nstatutory provision is in s. 148 ibid. But that provision,
\nas the words themselves show, is merely an enabling
\nprovision and it nowhere lays down that the method mentioned
\nin s. 148 is the only method of serving all documents on a
\ncompany. The section lays down that a document may be
\nserved on a company by leaving it or sending it by post at
\nthe registered office of the company. But the language
\nshows that that is not the only provision nor is it
\nimperative that service can be effected in the way mentioned
\nin that section, and in no other way. If that were the
\nintention this section of the Companies Act would have been
\nvery differently worded. We therefore find that there is
\none enabling,.provision in s. 148 of the Companies Act as to
\nthe manner in which documents may be served on a company or
\na corporation. Order XXIX, r. 2 lays down another method
\nalso in addition which courts may employ in effecting
\nservice on a corporation. To our mind either of the modes
\nspecified in s. 148 of the, Indian Companies Act or 0. XXIX,
\nr. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a reasonable mode of
\neffecting service on a company. It is said that 0. XXIX, r.
\n2 applies to a case of a suit by or against a corporation.
\nThat is undoubtedly so. But what is good service in suits
\nwould in our opinion
\n844
\nbe reasonable service for the purpose of r. 75-A (2).
\nTherefore, notices under r. 75-A (2) could be served on the
\nmills either in the manner provided in a. 148 of the
\nCompanies Act or in the manner provided in 0. XXIX, r.2 of
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure. In this case the manner
\nemployed for the service of notices under r. 75-A (2) is
\nthat provided in 0. XXIX, r. 2 (a), namely, by effecting
\nservice on the principal officer of the mills, namely, the
\nmanaging agents. We have already considered whether the
\norders of requisition on the various managing agents were
\nduly served and have held that it was so. We fail to see
\nwhy what was good service under 0. XXIX, r. 2 in the case of
\norders of requisition would not be good service or &
\nreasonable way of service in the case of notices of
\nacquisition, for it is not in dispute that the two were
\nserved on the same day one after the other and were
\nsubstantially the same. There was the same defect in the
\ntwo communications, namely, the heading where the name of
\nthe managing agent was mentioned did not contain in so many
\nwords that it was being addressed ” the managing agent of
\nsuch and such mill, but the schedule attached made it clear
\nthat was addressed as managing agent of those mills both for
\nthe purpose of requisition as well as for the purpose of
\nacquisition. The appeal court seems to think that though
\nthis kind of service was good for the purpose of requisition
\nit was not good for the purpose of acquisition, because
\nwhere acquisition was concerned it was necessary that there
\nmust be strict compliance with the manner of service, that
\nis, the heading should have also contained that the managing
\nagents were being addressed &a managing agents of particular
\nmills. We are of opinion that this view of the appeal court
\nis not correct and that what was good service in the case of
\norders of requisition was also good service in the matter of
\nnotices of acquisition, for in substance the two services
\nwere effected exactly in the same manner on the principal
\nofficer of the mills, which’in one case were in possession
\nof the goods and in other were owners of the goods. – We are
\ntherefore of opinion that service of the notices of
\nacquisition in this case
\n845
\non the managing agents of the mills was effective service on
\nthe mills as owners for the purpose of r. 75-A (2). In
\nconsequence r. 75-A (3) would apply and the property in the
\ngoods passed to the Government of india on September 30,
\n1946. The appeal of the Union of India therefore is allowed
\nand a declaration is granted that the goods were validly
\nrequisitioned and acquired and that the orders of
\nrequisition and notices of acquisition were valid and
\nbinding on the respective defendants, and the goods
\nspecified therein vested in the Government of India on
\nSeptember 30, 1946.
\nAs to costs, it appears that this litigation was due
\nentirely to the defect in the form of address of the
\nrequisition orders and the notices of acquisition. In the
\ncircumstances we order parties to bear their own costs
\nthroughout.
\nCivil Appeals Nos. 314 to 316 of 1957 dismissed.
\nCivil Appeal No. 778 of 1957 allowed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
PETITIONER: JUTE AND GUNNY BROKERS LTD.AND ANOTHER Vs. RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.(and connected appeals) DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/02\/1961 BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS CITATION: 1961 AIR 1214 1961 SCR (3) 820 CITATOR INFO : D 1973 SC2061 (12) F 1978 SC 389 (9,19,21,45) E 1980 SC1163 … Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"","fifu_image_alt":""},"categories":[4928],"tags":[],"amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29775"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29775"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29775\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":115012,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29775\/revisions\/115012"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29775"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29775"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kopykitab.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29775"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}